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Social Compensation: Fact
or Social-Comparison
Artifact?
Andrew R. Todd
Northwestern University
Dong-Heon Seok, Norbert L. Kerr and Lawrence A. Messé
Michigan State University
The use of coactors as non-group controls in prior social compensation research has left open
the possibility that the effect might artifactually have resulted from a confound between work
condition (Coaction vs. Collective) and the opportunity to make performance comparisons. A
direct empirical test of this alternative, artifactual explanation is reported. Its results contradict
that explanation and suggest that the use of coactors as controls has, if anything, resulted in an
underestimation of the magnitude of the social compensation effect. It is argued that multiple
alternative non-group performance baselines can be informative for analyzing group motivation
effects.
keywords group performance, motivation gains, social compensation, social
loafing
OVER the past 25 years there have been many
empirical demonstrations of motivation losses
or social loafing in small performance groups
(see Karau & Williams, 1993; Shepperd, 1993,
for reviews). However, in the last decade or so,
a handful of studies (e.g. Erev, Bornstein, &
Galili, 1993; Hertel, Kerr, & Messè, 2000; 
Kerr & MacCoun, 1984; Stroebe, Diehl, &
Abakoumkin, 1996) have documented group
motivation gain phenomena—that is, higher task
motivation within a group performance context
than within a comparable individual perform-
ance context. While empirical demonstrations
of motivation gains are rather rare (Hertel
et al., 2000), the social compensation effect is a
noteworthy example of one of the earliest and
most thoroughly studied of such phenomena
(e.g. Williams & Karau, 1991; Karau & Williams,
1997; Hart, Bridgett, & Karau, 2001).
Social compensation occurs when ‘. . . indi-
viduals increase their efforts on collective tasks
to compensate for the anticipated poor per-
formance of other group members’ (Karau &
Williams, 1997, p. 158). In the generic social
compensation study, subjects work at a simple,
effort-sensitive task1 (e.g. writing down as many
uses for a common object as possible) either in
a coacting pair (who are not interdependent
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nor able to directly monitor one another’s per-
formance, but simply work in one another’s
presence) or within a cooperative dyad (collec-
tive condition). The group task is (a) additive
(i.e. the group score is the simple sum of the
group members’ individual—but supposedly
unidentifiable—scores; Steiner, 1972) and (b)
information reducing (i.e. it is not possible to
identify the individual group members’ contri-
butions from the group performance; Davis,
1969). These are precisely the conditions under
which early social loafing research (e.g. Latané,
Williams, & Harkins, 1979) had found and
would predict less effort in the collective con-
dition. And indeed, when one receives pre-
performance information suggesting that one’s
partner is quite capable at the task (e.g. will
exert a high level of effort (Williams & Karau,
1991, Experiment 2), or has high task ability
(Williams & Karau, 1991, Experiment 3)), this
is exactly what is observed (see the left sides of
Figure 1a and 1b, which reproduce the results
of two of Williams & Karau’s early social com-
pensation studies). However, when feedback
suggests that one’s partner is very incapable, a
rather different pattern obtains (see the right
sides of Figure 1a and 1b). In the collective con-
dition, a good group performance can only be
achieved if one works extra hard to compensate
for the anticipated poor performance by one’s
teammate; it is under these conditions that the
social loafing effect is reversed and the social
compensation effect is observed.
This basic pattern has been replicated several
times (e.g. Karau & Williams, 1997; Hart et al.,
2001) and appears to be robust. However, the
design of these studies introduced a potential
confound that raises an alternative, artifactual
explanation for this social compensation effect.
The collective versus coactive contrast is
intended to—and indeed does—compare a
particular type of group performance (viz. per-
formers are interdependent and the nature of
that interdependence permits one group
member to compensate through his/her efforts
for an expected incapacity of a teammate) with
a corresponding individual performance (viz.
performers are independent and cannot affect
one another’s score or outcome through their
own level of performance). A coaction control
condition has typically been used (rather than
a lone individual performer) to control for
nuisance factors like modeling, distraction, and
mere presence of another performer. Unfortu-
nately, the coaction control condition also
allows the possibility of a direct, immediate, and
public comparison of scores with another per-
former, whereas the information-reducing
aspect of the group task makes such an inter-
personal comparison unfeasible. In fact, not
only is such comparison possible in the coactive
condition, instructions that are delivered to the
two coactors prior to the task suggest that such
comparison is certain (‘The experimenter also
told the participants that he would count up
their individual scores . . . at the end of the
session and tell them how many uses they had
produced’, p. 574, Williams & Karau, 1991).
Such opportunities for a direct and immediate
comparison could well lead to one using the
anticipated output of the coactor as a basis for
choosing one’s own level of effort—a type of
‘production matching’ with an implicit per-
formance standard (cf. Stroebe et al., 1996).
In sum, the social compensation effect could
be due: (a) to the imperative of compensating
for an incapable partner in the collective con-
dition (the usual interpretation); and/or (b) to
demotivating effects of public comparison with
an incapable other in the coaction condition
(an alternative, artifactual interpretation, which
we will term the social-comparison explanation).
The latter possibility is not theoretically far-
fetched; if one believes that the one person with
whom s/he will soon be publicly compared is
not very capable, one may feel that less effort is
required to insure a favorable comparison. In
addition, the expectation that one’s own per-
formance will probably surpass that of readily
available comparison others could well be
demotivating by reducing opportunities for
both meaningful self-evaluation and favorable
external evaluation (cf. Harkins, 2001). Consist-
ent with such speculation, empirical demon-
strations of the social compensation effect have
not been characterized by a dramatic rise in
effort when social compensation is needed (i.e.
in the incapable partner/collective condition),
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Figure 1. Results of Williams & Karau (1991), Experiments 2 & 3.
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but as the social-comparison explanation
implies, rather by a dramatic drop in effort in
the coaction control condition (see Figure 1).2
One counterargument to the artifactual
explanation is that a similar pattern of results
has been found (Williams & Karau, 1991,
Experiment 1) when the subject received no
direct feedback indicating that his/her partner
was incapable, but instead was chronically mis-
trustful of others (and thus, to ‘. . . expect
others to loaf’). Specifically, those medium and
high in level of trust showed a social loafing
effect (i.e. coactive > collective), whereas those
low in trust showed the opposite, social com-
pensation effect (i.e. collective > coactive). It
might be argued that absent direct feedback
that one’s partner was incapable, the purported
demotivating effect of being compared with
him/her should not occur. But these data are
inconclusive. First, mistrustfulness could breed
lowered expectation of the other’s likely per-
formance not just when the other is a teammate
but also when s/he is a coactor. Expectations of
the other’s performance were collected, but
analyzed in such a way that it is unclear whether
or not expectations were equally low for mis-
trustful participants in both the collective and
coaction conditions. Second, unlike the other
social compensation studies, the key moderator
here is a personality (rather than a situational)
factor, and thus, other relevant individual
differences could have been confounds (e.g. if
low trusters are also relatively more concerned
about a possibly invidious comparison). Thus,
although these data are not irrelevant to the
artifactual explanation, they do not rule it out.
The purpose of this brief paper is to report an
empirical examination of the artifactual social-
comparison explanation. We sought to (a) repli-
cate the usual social compensation effect (i.e.
with a coaction control), and then (b) include
another isolated-individual-performer control
condition in which direct and immediate social
comparison with an incapable coactor was not
possible. The various nuisance effects that
coaction has been designed to control (e.g. dis-
traction, modeling, mere presence) were con-
trolled in all conditions here by preventing
participants from seeing one another or their
work products during the experiment.3 Of
special interest are two possibilities: (1) that the
pattern of results is the same with an individual
control as with coactor controls, which would
contradict the artifactual explanation; and (2)
that the social compensation effect is eliminated
when one uses an individual control, findings
that would suggest the effect is entirely due to
the artifactual explanation. Of course, other
patterns are also possible and of interest (e.g.
the social compensation effect is attenuated but
not eliminated with the individual control, sug-
gesting that the artifact contributes to but does
not wholly account for the effect; the social com-
pensation effect is even stronger with individual
controls, suggesting that the opportunity for
social comparison—even with a very incapable
partner—is motivating and hence, that the use
of coactor controls actually underestimates the
magnitude of the social compensation effect).
To the degree that the artifactual social-com-
parison explanation is supported, the attribu-
tion veracity of the observed effect being due to
a motivation gain would be undermined. As a
result, we would be forced to conclude that
group motivation gain effects are even rarer
than previously thought.
Method
Participants and design
The participants (Ps) were 167 female under-
graduate students from introductory psychol-
ogy courses who received course credit for their
participation. (Note that previous studies, e.g.
Williams & Karau, 1991 and Hart et al., 2001,
report no moderation of the social compen-
sation effect by sex of participant.) The design
was a 2 (Partner capability: High vs. Low)  3
(Work condition: Collective vs. Coactive vs.
Individual) between-Ps factorial.
Task and procedure
The task was the same idea generation exercise
that most previous social compensation
research has used. Ps were asked to generate as
many uses for a common object (viz. knife) as
they could in a 12-minute period. Instructions
(taken nearly verbatim from Williams et al.,
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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1991) stressed quantity, not quality or creativity
of uses. In order to maximize the importance or
meaningfulness of the task, participants were
told that research suggested that performance
on the use-generating task is highly correlated
with intelligence and achievement; it has been
shown (Williams & Karau, 1991, Experiment 3)
that social compensation requires a task for
which good performance is important (other-
wise, why bother to compensate for an
incapable partner?). As they performed, Ps sat
opposite each other at computer tables with a
sight-blocking partition between them. In the
Coaction and Individual conditions, there was a
box on each table into which the uses were
placed (one per slip of paper). In the Collective
condition, there was a single, common box
inside the double-walled partition which caught
the slips of paper that both dyad members
pushed through slits in the partition walls.
These slits were so located that neither dyad
member could see when a slip was being
pushed through by her teammate or how many
slips there were in the box. To further eliminate
potential distraction, modeling, or mere
presence effects, Ps wore headphones playing
music as they performed the task.
Most Ps were scheduled in pairs and when
both showed up, either a Collective or Coactive
condition—randomly determined—was run.
When only one P signed or showed up, a female
confederate took on the partner role. Thus, all
sessions began with two partners present—
either two actual Ps or one P plus a confeder-
ate. As will become clear below, Ps in the
Individual condition always had the confeder-
ate as a partner.
The procedure used in this experiment was a
variation on the procedures used by Karau &
Williams (Experiment 2, 1997) and Hart et al.
(2001). Upon arrival, both the participants (or
the actual P and the confederate, if applicable)
were led to one of two computer tables in the
laboratory. Each of the computer tables was
equipped with a computer, a stack of exactly
fifty blank slips of paper, a pen, and a pair of
headphones.
After signing a consent form, Ps received a
description of the uses-generation task. In the
Coaction and Individual conditions, the exper-
imenter explained that she was interested in
their individual performances, not their collec-
tive performance. In the Collective condition,
the Ps were told that they comprised a two-
person group and that the experimenter was
only interested in the total number of uses
generated collectively by the group and not in
individual performances. The experimenter
also demonstrated how the single collection
box worked and, in doing so, stressed the
anonymity of individual contributions (e.g.
noted that the dyad members would use pens
with the same color ink).
Participants were then told that one purpose
of the experiment was to examine the effects of
standardized communication strategies on indi-
vidual and group task performance. Purport-
edly employees in large corporations had been
using banks of prewritten messages in order to
simplify email communication, and we were
interested in investigating the effect of this
form of standardized communication on
employee performance and satisfaction. Ps
were to choose one message from each of
three banks of standardized messages (three
messages total) that would be sent to their
coworker via computer. The first bank
expressed Ps’ interest in the task (seven alterna-
tive messages whose content communicated
differing levels of task interest, ranging from
very high to very low). The second bank
expressed Ps’ expected level of effort on the
coming task. The third bank expressed Ps’ self-
perceived ability at the coming task. After
choosing one message from each bank, Ps
clicked a button to send their message set to
their partner (in fact, these messages were
never sent). Ps then shortly after received three
messages, allegedly from their partner. In all
conditions, the partner’s first message
expressed a high interest in the task. The
remaining two messages manipulated the
partner’s task capability. In the High capability
condition, the messages were ‘My effort on this
task will be extremely high’ and ‘My ability on
this task is extremely high’. In the Low capabil-
ity condition, the messages were ‘My effort on
this task will be extremely low’ and ‘My ability
Todd et al. social compensation
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on this task is extremely low’.4 While the
message-exchanging portion of the experiment
was taking place, the experimenter left the
room; moreover, after reading the messages
received, Ps clicked a button that allegedly per-
manently erased the messages. This was done to
ensure that Ps believed that the experimenter
would not be able to ascertain either a P’s pro-
fessed level of motivation or their ability to
perform the task.5
After a short interval which gave Ps the
opportunity to read the messages sent by their
partner, the experimenter re-entered the lab.
In the Individual condition only, the experi-
menter asked the confederate whether she was,
as she had indicated on her consent form,
under 18 years of age. The confederate said she
was. The experimenter explained that she
could not participate without parental consent
and that she would have to obtain such consent
before she could be rescheduled. For this
reason, she was excused from the experiment
and left the lab. Note that this procedure
insured that the true P in the Individual con-
dition always had the knowledge that another
ostensibly random participant was either very
high or very low in task capability (as in the
other two work conditions), but it removed the
opportunity for a direct, immediate, and public
performance comparison with that participant
at the conclusion of the task. (Of course, in
theory, the experimenter could later compare
an Individual P’s performance with that of
other participants, but there was no possibility
in this condition of immanent comparison
which we assume to be the P’s concern in our
social-comparison alternative to the usual social
compensation explanation.)
At this point the participant(s) were directed
to put on their headphones and to follow the
rest of the instructions contained on the tape.
The experimenter again left the room. The
instructions on the tape, which described the
specific object (i.e. a knife) for which they were
to generate as many uses as they could, were
followed by 12 minutes of music, during which
the participants worked at the task—thinking of
uses for the target object, writing their answer
on slips of paper, folding the slips and placing
them in their collection box(es). The experi-
menter monitored the time using a stopwatch.
At the end of the work period, Ps were given a
post-experimental questionnaire that con-
tained manipulation checks and checks of
suspicion. Finally, Ps were debriefed, thanked,
and dismissed.
Results
Manipulation checks
P’s were asked to assess on 7-point rating scales
how much effort the partner was willing to exert
at the task and how much ability she had. As one
would expect, the partner in the Low capability
conditions was seen both as willing to exert less
effort (M = 3.92) and having less ability (M =
4.22) than the partner in the High capability
condition (effort M = 6.31, t(152) = 8.36, p <
.001, d = 1.36; ability M = 5.65, t(152) = 5.79, p <
.001, d = .94); reduced degrees of freedom
reflect missing data due to failures to complete
the questionnaire). Hence, the manipulation of
partner capability was successful.
Analyses of performance
Replication of the social compensation effect?
The first question we examined was whether we
replicated the basic social compensation effect
under the typical conditions (viz. with coactors
as controls). In all conditions, the ideas gener-
ated were counted by subtracting the number
of unused slips from 50 (all Ps were given 50
slips of paper before beginning the idea-
generation task). The key contrast tests an
interaction effect—is the usual social loafing
effect observed when one believes that one has
a very capable partner (i.e. Collective <
Coactive) reversed when one believes that one
has a very incapable partner (i.e. Coactive <
Collective)? A test of this contrast was statisti-
cally significant (F(1,161) = 4.02, p < .05, d =
.32), and as one can see in Figure 2 (white and
black bars), the same pattern is observed as in
the usual social compensation study (see Figure
1). In the present study, the social loafing effect
(High capability partner) was significant
(t(161) = 1.96, p = .05, d = .31), whereas the
social compensation contrast (Low capability
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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partner) was not (t(161) = .89, ns). Keep in
mind that the same opportunity for social
loafing (low identifiability of individual contri-
butions to the collective product) is available in
both collective conditions, so the important
result is that the social loafing effect is signifi-
cantly moderated (i.e. the interaction effect),
not that it is significantly reversed (i.e. the work
condition simple effect with the Low capability
partner; cf. Note 2).6
Tests of the social comparison explanation
There are several ways in which to test this
explanation. The most direct is to see if the
level of effort in the Low capability/Individual
control condition (where no direct social com-
parison is possible) is any different than in the
Low capability/Coaction control condition
(where such comparison is possible). The test
of this contrast was not significant (t(161) = .87,
ns). As one can see on the right side of Figure
2, the level of performance in the Individual
control condition (diagonal stripe bar) was
actually lower than in the Coaction control
(white bar), exactly the opposite to the pattern
predicted by the social-comparison explanation.
Our results suggest that had one attempted to
demonstrate the social compensation effect
using Individual controls rather than Coactive
controls, the key interaction effect would have
been stronger (here, t(161) = 2.52, p < .015,
Cohen’s d = .40 compared to d = .32 with coactor
controls), not weaker or nonsignificant, as the
social compensation explanation would predict.
Although it was not of primary interest in this
study, it is also worthwhile to examine the
Individual control for the High capability con-
dition. If having someone to compare oneself
to was (if anything) motivating, even if that
someone was likely to be a poor performer, it
Todd et al. social compensation
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could be that performance would also be lower
in the Individual/High capability condition
than the Coaction/High capability condition.
But as one can see in Figure 2, this was not the
case; there was no difference between these two
control conditions (t(161) = .07, ns). It is at
least possible, though, that ceiling effects may
have prevented such an effect from emerging
here.
Discussion
The use of coaction controls in prior social com-
pensation research has left open the possibility
that the effect might artifactually have resulted
from a confound between work condition
(Coaction vs. Collective) and the opportunity to
make performance comparisons. If making
such a comparison with a very incapable other
were demotivating, then it could have been the
case that the social compensation effect had
little or nothing to do with the need to compen-
sate for an incapable partner, but stemmed
instead from such a social comparison process.
In the present study, we directly tested this
alternative, artifactual explanation for the social
compensation effect. Our data strongly contra-
dict it. Removing the opportunity for immediate
public comparison with an incapable other did
not, as this explanation would predict, increase
effort, but actually tended (nonsignificantly) to
decrease effort. It appears that the opportunity
for comparison is (if anything) motivating, even
when the person with whom one will compare is
very likely to perform poorly. Thus, far from
being the source of an artifactual explanation,
the use of the coaction control in prior social
compensation has tended to work against
demonstrating the effect, and to underestimat-
ing its strength.
These findings have several useful impli-
cations. First, and most obviously, they bolster
the validity of the original interpretation of the
best documented of the few extant group moti-
vation gain effects, the social compensation
effect. That interpretation suggested that the
observed motivation gain was attributable to a
particular pattern of outcome interpendence—
where one’s prospects of obtaining a highly
valued outcome (e.g. a group success)
depended upon compensating for the per-
ceived incapacities of other group members by
working extra hard. However, quite apart from
the alternative social-comparison explanation
examined here, there were theoretical and
empirical reasons to doubt that interpretation.
For example, when the rewards of group
success are shared equally by all group
members (as they were here and in prior social
compensation research), socially compensating
for others can result in doing more than an
equal or fair share of the group’s work. Such an
inequitable arrangement has been shown to
lead to motivation losses under some con-
ditions—at times, group members will reduce
their own efforts (and consequently, the
chances of group success) rather than do more
than what they see as a fair share of the group’s
work. Williams and Karau (1991) suggest that
this aversion to ‘playing the sucker’ can be
overcome if one places a sufficiently high value
on group success; they even demonstrate (in
their Experiment 3) that the social compen-
sation effect is eliminated if the group’s task is
seen as unimportant to its members. By discon-
firming a plausible alternative to the social com-
pensation explanation, our results lend
credibility to their suggestion. Apparently,
group members who are exerting supernormal
levels of effort will put up with doing an
inequitable share of the group’s work if group
success is sufficiently valued.
Our study also touches on a fundamental
issue in the study of group motivation—what is
the proper non-group baseline against which to
detect group motivation gains or losses? Some
(e.g. Karau & Williams, 1993; Williams & Karau,
1991) have argued that coactors provide the
most appropriate baseline. Others (e.g. Kerr,
1983; Markus, 2001) have argued that isolated
individuals represent better baselines. As the
present paper suggests, this controversy is par-
tially a matter of how best to avoid uninterest-
ing confounds (e.g. to control for ‘mere
presence’ effects when probing for group moti-
vation gains or losses). But it is also a matter of
a fundamental conceptual issue—viz. ‘what is
and is not a group’? There is no universally
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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agreed upon answer to this question; however,
many if not most scholars include shared goals
and some degree of mutual interdependence as
necessary properties of a group, especially a
performance group (cf. Forsyth, 1999). Our
own preference for isolated individuals as the
best non-group baseline stems from the fact
that many typical elements of the coaction
setting (such as the mere presence of others,
the possibility of distraction, the possibility of
attentional conflict, the opportunity to observe
others perform, the opportunity to compare
levels of performance), while common
elements of performance groups, are not
defining necessary conditions. Thus, motiva-
tional gains or losses which ultimately stem
from such elements could well be viewed as not
being essentially group phenomena, but
instead being phenomena that can arise in
certain group settings but not others. On the
other hand, one could argue (as Latané et al.,
1979, did implicitly in their seminal social
loafing paper) that if certain elements (e.g.
individual member contributions being
unidentifiable from a group product) are
routine features of many performance groups,
then the motivational effects of those elements
could fairly be classified as group effects (even
if those same elements are not necessary for all
or even most performance groups).
Clearly, this is partially a semantic issue, but it
is more than that. The answer to many import-
ant questions—e.g. is a particular effect a
genuine group motivation loss or gain? where
should one look for such effects? when it comes
to application, are groups or teams superior or
inferior to individuals as performers?—ulti-
mately depends on just what processes we
classify as group processes. And whenever indi-
vidual performance differs in individual and
coactive performance settings, the answers we
come up with depend on just which baseline we
choose. Consider, for example, the following:
• Another recently documented (purported)
group motivation gain is the Köhler motiva-
tion gain effect (Hertel et al., 2000). Here, it
is the least capable group member who must
work extra hard because the task demands
are conjunctive (Steiner, 1972)—i.e. the
group’s performance depends on the least
capable member’s performance. The
original (Köhler, 1926) and subsequent
(Hertel et al., 2000; Messé, Hertel, Kerr,
Lount, & Park, 2002; Stroebe et al., 1996)
empirical demonstrations of the effect have
all used isolated individual performers as
their non-group baselines. But some of the
proposed explanations of this effect do not
require what we have advanced as conditions
necessary for groups. For example, Stroebe
et al.’s (1996) goal setting explanation only
requires the availability of a more capable
performer, not the existence of a more
capable group member working toward a
common goal with some interdependence
(e.g. a conjunctive group task). If such
explanations are valid, then we might expect
the Köhler effect to occur in a number of
coaction settings. Although an initial attempt
to test this possibility offered little support to
the goal setting explanation (see Hertel
et al., 2000, Experiment 2), subsequent tests
suggest that it does provide a partial expla-
nation of the effect (Kerr, Seok, Poulsen,
Harris, & Messé, 2006). The important point
is that we could have come to different con-
clusions about whether the Köhler effect was
a genuine group motivation gain, how large
it was, and why it occurred had we chosen
isolated individuals or coactors as our
baseline of non-group performance.
• Members of mixed-sex dyads have been
shown to work harder than either members
of same-sex dyads or isolated individual
controls, an effect that has been interpreted
as a group motivation gain (Kerr & Sullaway,
1983; Kerr & MacCoun, 1984). But if this
effect is the result of concerns about violat-
ing traditional sex role expectations, then it
may not require collaborative group
action—mixed-sex sets of coactors could
show a similar effect.
• Other work has shown that members of
groups who can engage in intra- (Stroebe
et al., 1996) or intergroup (Erev et al., 1993;
Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart, & Bute-
meyer, 1998) competition work harder than
Todd et al. social compensation
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individual controls. But certain explanations
of this effect suggest that coaction settings
which offer similar opportunities for compe-
tition might produce quite similar effects.
• Markus (2001) has shown that some social
loafing effects might be attributable to the
differential effects of individual vs. coaction
work conditions on intrinsic task motivation.
We suspect that such issues cannot and
should not be resolved by fiat—by simply
declaring one particular non-group baseline as
the ‘gold standard’ for group motivation
effects. Rather, we would like to suggest that the
two most popular non-group baselines—
isolated individuals and coacting individuals—
both provide informative baselines for
analyzing psychological processes of relevance
to how hard people work in groups. In the
present study we were able to narrow the range
of plausible explanations for the social compen-
sation effect by including both baselines.
Future work on group motivation could and
should be likewise enriched by including
multiple baselines. And even when this is not
possible, scholars would be well advised to
consider the theoretical implications of exam-
ining alternatives to the baselines they do
employ.
Notes
1. By effort-sensitive, we mean a task for which
performance is entirely or almost entirely a
function of effort (rather than other factors, like
ability, insight, luck, etc.) and for which there is a
monotonic relationship between performance
and effort.
2. It must be conceded that the pattern in these
data—a relatively low level of performance of the
coactor-low capability partner, compared to
coactor-high capability partner—could result
from processes other than the social comparison
explanation proposed here. For example, it is
conceivable that one tends to match a coworker’s
expected level of performance, regardless of
whether performance levels will subsequently be
compared. This would result in generally lower
performance in the low partner capability
conditions (which could then be further
moderated by a social compensation effect,
resulting in a relatively higher level of
performance in the collective-incapable partner
condition). Thus, we agree with Williams and
Karau’s suggestion that the result of primary
interest is a particular interaction effect, viz. the
reversal—when one has an incapable partner—of
the usual social loafing effect (observed here
when one has a capable partner, or as in the
typical social loafing study, when one knows
nothing about others’ capabilities).
3. It should also be noted that the use of a coaction
control condition is not always simply a matter of
controlling nuisance variables. A number of tests
of substantive theories of social facilitation and
social loafing have suggested that working alone
is psychologically different than working
alongside others (e.g. Cottrell, 1972; Harkins,
1987, 2001; Sanna, 1992).
4. Note that we jointly varied ability and motivation
feedback to create the High and Low 
partner-capability conditions. In an experiment
which orthogonally manipulated ability and
motivation feedback, Hart et al., (2001) found
that the standard social compensation effect only
occurred when both were low. This suggests that
in earlier studies (e.g. Williams & Karau, 1991)
where only one of these two bases for capability
had been manipulated, Ps presumed that the
other varied in kind (e.g. a poorly motivated
partner was also likely to have low ability).
5. Another possible boundary condition on social
compensation is that those who evaluate group
task performance (e.g. a supervisor; the
experimenter) should not know that there is an
incapable member in the group. Otherwise, such
an evaluator might attribute a poor group
performance not to the team as a whole
(including the more capable member) but just to
the incapable member’s probable poor
performance. The more capable member should
not be as likely to try to compensate under such
conditions.
6. We have also argued (see Note 2) that neither the
significance of the simple partner-capability main
effects nor or their relative (absolute) magnitudes
are of special interest here. However, for the
interested reader, the simple partner-capability
main effect under coactive conditions was not
significant (t(161) = .73, ns), while the
corresponding simple main effect under
collective conditions was (t(161) = –2.01, p < .05,
d = .32). 
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